Shareholding Structure, Investment Efficiency and Firm Value: Evidence from the Chinese Securities Market

Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (volume 136)

Abstract

The paper examined the relationship among shareholding structure, over-investment and firm value through empirical test. From the view of financing, we find the state-owned enterprises are easier to obtain credit resources than private enterprises for credit discrimination. But the more they get credit resources, the worse their firm values. Furthermore, from the view of investment we find state-owned enterprises get more credit resources with more serious over-investment, which reduces firm value. The research conclusion has profound significance to guide the private capital to participate in the reform of state-owned enterprises.

Keywords

Shareholding structure Investment efficiency Firm value 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Economic and Business AdministrationChongqing UniversityChongqingChina

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