Shareholding Structure, Investment Efficiency and Firm Value: Evidence from the Chinese Securities Market
The paper examined the relationship among shareholding structure, over-investment and firm value through empirical test. From the view of financing, we find the state-owned enterprises are easier to obtain credit resources than private enterprises for credit discrimination. But the more they get credit resources, the worse their firm values. Furthermore, from the view of investment we find state-owned enterprises get more credit resources with more serious over-investment, which reduces firm value. The research conclusion has profound significance to guide the private capital to participate in the reform of state-owned enterprises.
KeywordsShareholding structure Investment efficiency Firm value
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