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Model Checking Adaptive Multilevel Service Compositions

  • Sabina Rossi
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6921)

Abstract

In this paper we present a logic-based technique for verifying both security and correctness properties of multilevel service compositions. We define modal μ-calculus formulae interpreted over service configurations. Our formulae characterize those compositions which satisfy a non-interference property and are compliant, i.e., are both deadlock and livelock free. Moreover, we use filters as prescriptions of behavior (coercions to prevent service misbehavior) and we devise a model checking algorithm for adaptive service compositions which automatically synthesizes an adapting filter.

Keywords

Model Check Service Composition Security Level Complete Lattice Service Orient Architecture 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sabina Rossi
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità Ca’ FoscariVeneziaItaly

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