Effective Electronic Advertisement Auction System

  • Tokuro Matsuo
  • Satoshi Takahashi
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 266)


A structure of the Internet advertisement is that the service providers decide order of placement of many advertisements and advertising fees by auctions when advertisers offer their promotions. It is known that Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) mechanism is most efficient auction mechanism of the advertisement auction. Some searching sites employ GSP mechanism basically. There are a lot of researches on GSP in order to analyze and clarify its feature and advantages. However, these researches assume that traded advertisements are mutually independent. That is means that each advertisement does not influence other advertisements. Also these researches do not consider a value of advertisement, which means some criterions of a name value of a company, an effectiveness and an importance, that is dependently each other. This paper proposes a new advertisement auction mechanism based on GSP with considering the value of advertisement. We analyze the auctioneer’s profit in comparison between normal GSP, normal VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism) and our proposed mechanism. The contribution of our research includes to clarify the features and advantages of advertisement auctions and effects to search service sites’ profit rate.


Price Auction Auction Mechanism Winner Determination Internet Auction Auction Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
  2. 2.
  3. 3.
    Vickrey, W.: Couterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal of Finance 16(1), 8–37 (1961)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., Schwarz, M.: Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. American Economic Review 9(1), 242–259 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Brooks, N.: The Atlas Rank Report: How Search Engine Rank Impact Traffic, Insights, Atlas Institute Digital Marketing (2004)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Milgrom, P.: Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge University Press (2004)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Varian, H.R.: Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization 25, 1163–1178 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Abrams, Z., Schwarz, M.: Ad Auction Design and User Experience. In: Deng, X., Graham, F.C. (eds.) WINE 2007. LNCS, vol. 4858, pp. 529–534. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Guruswami, V., Hartline, J.D., Karlin, A.R., Kempe, D., Kenyon, C., McSherry, F.: On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing. In: Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 1164–1173 (2005)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tokuro Matsuo
    • 1
  • Satoshi Takahashi
    • 2
  1. 1.Graduate School of Science and EngineeringYamagata UniversityYonezawaJapan
  2. 2.Graduate School of System and Information EngineeringUniversity of TsukubaTsukubaJapan

Personalised recommendations