Information Security in a Quantum World
It is well known that classical computationally-secure cryptosystems may be susceptible to quantum attacks, i.e., attacks by adversaries able to process quantum information. A prominent example is the RSA public key cryptosystem, whose security is based on the hardness of factoring; it can be broken using a quantum computer running Shor’s efficient factoring algorithm. In this extended abstract, we review an argument which shows that a similar problem can arise even if a cryptosystem provides information-theoretic security. As long as its security analysis is carried out within classical information theory, attacks by quantum adversaries cannot in general be excluded.
KeywordsQuantum Memory Security Proof Quantum World Legitimate Parti Classical Information Theory
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