A Robust Multi-unit Ascending-Price Auction with Complementarities against Strategic Manipulation
Auctions have become enormously popular in recent years. A typical example is spectrum auction for distributions of licenses for electromagnetic spectrum based on simultaneous ascending-price auction. Even though this auction is popular, it is not robust against some strategic manipulations of buyers. While allowing buyers to submit alternative choices (due dates in this paper) in XOR bids, we propose a new auction mechanism called simultaneous ascending-price auction with option proposal (SAA-OP). One of the important characteristics of this mechanism is that there are two types of auction winners: an auctioneer chooses winners (exact fulfillments) or buyers take options proposed by the auctioneer (partial fulfillments). Due to this characteristic, the proposing mechanism implements an ex-post efficient equilibrium.
KeywordsUnit Price Combinatorial Auction Auction Mechanism Social Surplus Winner Determination
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