Adaptive Choice of Behavior and Protocol Parameters

  • Frank Grove
  • Sandip Sen
  • Oly Mistry
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7057)


Research on interaction between multiple self-interested agents has focused on either designing rational behavior for agents given the interaction protocol or designing the interaction protocol that will promote desirable rational behavior by agents. We believe that in certain situations self-interested agents can be interested in both choosing desirable protocols and deciding effective strategies to follow under the chosen protocol. We experiment with a market situation where agents repeatedly negotiate to decide on the allocation of indivisible resources. We present a parameterized protocol selection scheme which can be used by agents to select the interaction protocol to use. We show that learning agents can greatly improve performance by adapting the protocol used and the behavior adopted against a range of opponents.


Multiagent System Interaction Protocol Learning Agent Negotiation Behavior True Valuation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frank Grove
    • 1
  • Sandip Sen
    • 1
  • Oly Mistry
    • 1
  1. 1.University of TulsaTulsaUSA

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