Getting Web Authentication Right A Best-Case Protocol for the Remaining Life of Passwords

  • Joseph Bonneau
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7114)

Abstract

We outline an end-to-end password authentication protocol for the web designed to be stateless and as secure as possible given legacy limitations of the web browser and performance constraints of commercial web servers. Our scheme is secure against very strong but passive attackers able to observe both network traffic and the server’s database state. At the same time, our scheme is simple for web servers to implement and requires no changes to modern, HTML5-compliant browsers. We assume TLS is available for initial login and no other public-key cryptographic operations, but successfully defend against cookie-stealing and cookie-forging attackers and provide strong resistance to password guessing attacks.

Keywords

Message Authentication Code Password Authentication User Password Passive Attacker Distribute System Security Symposium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph Bonneau
    • 1
  1. 1.University of CambridgeCambridgeUK

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