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Selective Location Blinding Using Hash Chains

  • Gabriele Lenzini
  • Sjouke Mauw
  • Jun Pang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7114)

Abstract

Location-based applications require a user’s movements and positions to provide customized services. However, location is a sensitive piece of information that should not be revealed unless strictly necessary. In this paper we propose a procedure that allows a user to control the precision in which his location information is exposed to a service provider, while allowing his location to be certified by a location verifier. Our procedure makes use of a hash chain to certify the location information in such a way that the hashes of the chain correspond to an increasing level of precision.

Keywords

Service Provider Global Position System Location Privacy User Device Global Position System Satellite 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gabriele Lenzini
    • 1
  • Sjouke Mauw
    • 1
    • 2
  • Jun Pang
    • 2
  1. 1.Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and TrustUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourg
  2. 2.Computer Science and CommunicationsUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourg

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