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Practical Analysis of Reduced-Round Keccak

  • María Naya-Plasencia
  • Andrea Röck
  • Willi Meier
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7107)

Abstract

Keccak is a finalist of the SHA-3 competition. In this paper we propose a practical distinguisher on 4 rounds of the hash function with the submission parameters. Recently, the designers of Keccak published several challenges on reduced versions of the hash function. With regard to this, we propose a preimage attack on 2 rounds, a collision attack on 2 rounds and a near collision on 3 rounds of \(\lfloor\) Keccak \(\rfloor_{224}\) and \(\lfloor\) Keccak \(\rfloor_{256}\). These are the first practical cryptanalysis results on reduced rounds of the hash function scenario. All of our results have been implemented.

Keywords

hash function Keccak practical cryptanalysis SHA-3 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • María Naya-Plasencia
    • 1
    • 3
  • Andrea Röck
    • 2
  • Willi Meier
    • 1
  1. 1.FHNWWindischSwitzerland
  2. 2.Aalto University School of ScienceFinland
  3. 3.University of VersaillesFrance

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