Resettable Cryptography in Constant Rounds – The Case of Zero Knowledge

  • Yi Deng
  • Dengguo Feng
  • Vipul Goyal
  • Dongdai Lin
  • Amit Sahai
  • Moti Yung
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_21

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7073)
Cite this paper as:
Deng Y., Feng D., Goyal V., Lin D., Sahai A., Yung M. (2011) Resettable Cryptography in Constant Rounds – The Case of Zero Knowledge. In: Lee D.H., Wang X. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2011. ASIACRYPT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7073. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

A fundamental question in cryptography deals with understanding the role that randomness plays in cryptographic protocols and to what extent it is necessary. One particular line of works was initiated by Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali (STOC 2000) who introduced the notion of resettable zero-knowledge, where the protocol must be zero-knowledge even if a cheating verifier can reset the prover and have several interactions in which the prover uses the same random tape. Soon afterwards, Barak, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Lindell (FOCS 2001) studied the setting where the verifier uses a fixed random tape in multiple interactions. Subsequent to these works, a number of papers studied the notion of resettable protocols in the setting where only one of the participating parties uses a fixed random tape multiple times. The notion of resettable security has been studied in two main models: the plain model and the bare public key model (also introduced in the above paper by Canetti et. al.).

In a recent work, Deng, Goyal and Sahai (FOCS 2009) gave the first construction of a simultaneous resettable zero-knowledge protocol where both participants of the protocol can reuse a fixed random tape in any (polynomial) number of executions. Their construction however required O(nε) rounds of interaction between the prover and the verifier. Both in the plain as well as the BPK model, this construction remain the only known simultaneous resettable zero-knowledge protocols.

In this work, we study the question of round complexity of simultaneous resettable zero-knowledge in the BPK model. We present a constant round protocol in such a setting based on standard cryptographic assumptions. Our techniques are significantly different from the ones used by Deng, Goyal and Sahai.

Download to read the full conference paper text

Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yi Deng
    • 1
    • 2
  • Dengguo Feng
    • 3
  • Vipul Goyal
    • 2
  • Dongdai Lin
    • 3
  • Amit Sahai
    • 4
  • Moti Yung
    • 5
  1. 1.NTUSingapore
  2. 2.SKLOIS, Institute of SoftwareCASChina
  3. 3.MSRIndia
  4. 4.UCLAUSA
  5. 5.Google Inc.USA

Personalised recommendations