A Secure Internet Voting Scheme

  • Md. Abdul Based
  • Stig Fr. Mjølsnes
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7017)

Abstract

We describe information security requirements for a secure and functional Internet voting scheme. Then we present the voting scheme with multiple parties; this voting scheme satisfies all these security requirements. In this scheme, the voter gets a signed key from the registrar, where the registrar signs the key as blinded. The voter uses this signed key during the voting period. All other parties can verify this signature without knowing the identity of the voter, hence the scheme provides privacy of the voter. This voting scheme also satisfies voter verifiability and public verifiability. In addition, the scheme is receipt-free.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Md. Abdul Based
    • 1
  • Stig Fr. Mjølsnes
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of TelematicsNorwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)Norway

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