Criticality-Driven Component Integration in Complex Software Systems

  • Antonio Pecchia
  • Roberto Pietrantuono
  • Stefano Russo
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6894)

Abstract

Complex software systems are commonly developed by integrating multiple, occasionally Off-The-Shelf (OTS), components. This process results into a more modular design and reduces development costs; however, it raises new dependability challenges in case of safety critical systems. Testing activities conducted during the development of the individual components might be not enough to ensure a proper safety level after the integration. The failures of the components and their impact on the overall system safety have to be assessed in critical scenarios. This paper proposes a method to support component integration in complex software systems. The method uses (i) the knowledge of the architectural dependencies among the system components, and (ii) the results of failure-modes emulation experiments, to assess both error propagation phenomena within the system and the criticality of the components in the system architecture. This information is valuable to design effective error-mitigation means and, when needed, to select the most suitable OTS item if multiple equivalent options are available. The method is applied to a real world Air Traffic Control system, developed in the context of an academic-industrial collaboration.

Keywords

Integration Criticality Assessment Failure-modes Emulation Air Traffic Control 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Antonio Pecchia
    • 1
  • Roberto Pietrantuono
    • 1
  • Stefano Russo
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Informatica e SistemisticaUniversitá degli Studi di Napoli Federico IINaplesItaly

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