Agreeing to Disagree with Limit Knowledge

  • Christian W. Bach
  • Jérémie Cabessa
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6953)


The possibility for agents to agree to disagree is considered in an extended epistemic-topological framework. In such an enriched context, Aumann’s impossibility theorem is shown to no longer hold. More precisely, agents with a common prior belief satisfying limit knowledge instead of common knowledge of their posterior beliefs may actually entertain distinct posterior beliefs. Hence, agents can actually agree to disagree. In particular, agreeing to disagree with limit knowledge is illustrated within a representative epistemic-topological situation.


agreeing to disagree agreement theorems limit knowledge interactive epistemology 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christian W. Bach
    • 1
  • Jérémie Cabessa
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Quantitative EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Massachusetts AmherstAmherstUnited States

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