True Trustworthy Elections: Remote Electronic Voting Using Trusted Computing

  • Matt Smart
  • Eike Ritter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6906)

Abstract

We present a new remote, coercion-resistant electronic voting protocol which satisfies a number of properties previously considered contradictory. We introduce trusted computing as a method of ensuring the trustworthiness of remote voters, and provide an extension to our protocol allowing revocable anonymity, on the grounds of it being a legal requirement in the United Kingdom.

Keywords

Signature Scheme Bulletin Board Trust Platform Module Homomorphic Encryption Trust Computing 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matt Smart
    • 1
  • Eike Ritter
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceUniversity of BirminghamUK

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