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Practical Remote End-to-End Voting Scheme

  • Xun Yi
  • Eiji Okamoto
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6866)

Abstract

Recently, remote voting systems have gained popularity and have been used for government elections and referendums in the United Kingdom, Estonia and Switzerland as well as municipal elections in Canada and party primary elections in the United States and France. Current remote voting schemes assume either the voter’s personal computer is trusted or the voter is not physically coerced. In this paper, we present a remote end-to-end voting scheme, in which the voter’s choice remains secret even if the voter’s personal computer is infected by malware or the voter is physically controlled by the adversary. In particular, our scheme can achieve absolute verifiability even if all election authorities are corrupt. Based on homomorphic encryption, the overhead for tallying in our scheme is linear in the number of candidates. Thus, our scheme is practical for elections at a large scale, such as general elections.

Keywords

Electronic voting coercion-resistance 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xun Yi
    • 1
  • Eiji Okamoto
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Engineering and ScienceVictoria UniversityMelbourneAustralia
  2. 2.Department of Risk EngineeringUniversity of TsukubaTsukubaJapan

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