BBox: A Distributed Secure Log Architecture

  • Rafael Accorsi
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6711)

Abstract

This paper presents BBox, a digital black box to provide for authentic archiving in distributed systems. Based upon public key cryptography and trusted computing platforms, the BBox employs standard primitives to ensure the authenticity of records during the transmission from devices to the collector, as well as during their storage on the collector and retrieval by auditors. Besides presenting the technical underpinnings of the BBox, this paper demonstrates the authenticity guarantees it ensures and reports on the preliminary deployment figures.

Keywords

Distributed log architecture public key cryptography 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rafael Accorsi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of TelematicsUniversity of FreiburgGermany

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