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Local Matching Dynamics in Social Networks

  • Martin Hoefer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6756)

Abstract

We study stable marriage and roommates problems in graphs with locality constraints. Each player is a node in a social network and has an incentive to match with other players. The value of a match is specified by an edge weight. Players explore possible matches only based on their current neighborhood. We study convergence of natural better-response dynamics that converge to locally stable matchings – matchings that allow no incentive to deviate with respect to their imposed information structure in the social network. For every starting state we construct in polynomial time a sequence of polynomially many better-response moves to a locally stable matching. However, for a large class of oblivious dynamics including random and concurrent better-response the convergence time turns out to be exponential. In contrast, convergence time becomes polynomial if we allow the players to have a small amount of random memory, even for many-to-many matchings and more general notions of neighborhood.

Keywords

Stable Match Preference List Social Link Matching Edge Marked Vertex 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Hoefer
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceRWTH Aachen UniversityGermany

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