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Argumentative Agents Negotiating on Potential Attacks

  • Guido Boella
  • Dov M. Gabbay
  • Alan Perotti
  • Leendert van der Torre
  • Serena Villata
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6682)

Abstract

When arguing, agents may want to discuss about the details after agreeing about the general problems. We propose to model this kind of situation using an extended argumentation framework with potential attacks. Agents negotiate about raising potential attacks or not, in order to maximize the number of their accepted arguments. The result of the negotiation process consists in the formation of coalitions composed by those agents which have found an agreement. The two proposed negotiation protocols have been implemented and an evaluation, addressed by means of experimental results, shows which combination of strategies and negotiation protocol allows the agents to optimize outcomes.

Keywords

Multiagent System Negotiation Process Coalition Structure Potential Attack Argumentation Framework 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guido Boella
    • 1
  • Dov M. Gabbay
    • 2
  • Alan Perotti
    • 1
  • Leendert van der Torre
    • 3
  • Serena Villata
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversity of TurinItaly
  2. 2.King’s College LondonUK
  3. 3.CSCUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourg

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