Composable Security Analysis of OS Services

  • Ran Canetti
  • Suresh Chari
  • Shai Halevi
  • Birgit Pfitzmann
  • Arnab Roy
  • Michael Steiner
  • Wietse Venema
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6715)

Abstract

We provide an analytical framework for basic integrity properties of file systems, namely the binding of files to filenames and writing capabilities. A salient feature of our modeling and analysis is that it is composable: In spite of the fact that we analyze the filesystem in isolation, security is guaranteed even when the file system operates as a component within an arbitrary, and potentially adversarial system.

Our results are obtained by adapting the Universally Composable (UC) security framework to the analysis of software systems. Originally developed for cryptographic protocols, the UC framework allows the analysis of simple components in isolation, and provides assurance that these components maintain their behavior when combined in a large system, potentially under adversarial conditions.

Keywords

System Call Security Property Cryptographic Protocol Ideal World Parent Directory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ran Canetti
    • 2
  • Suresh Chari
    • 1
  • Shai Halevi
    • 1
  • Birgit Pfitzmann
    • 1
  • Arnab Roy
    • 1
  • Michael Steiner
    • 1
  • Wietse Venema
    • 1
  1. 1.IBM T.J. Watson Research CenterUSA
  2. 2.Tel-Aviv UniversityIsrael

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