Quasi-Linear Cryptanalysis of a Secure RFID Ultralightweight Authentication Protocol

  • Pedro Peris-Lopez
  • Julio Cesar Hernandez-Castro
  • Raphael C. -W. Phan
  • Juan M. E. Tapiador
  • Tieyan Li
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6584)

Abstract

In 2010, Yeh, Lo and Winata [1] proposed a process-oriented ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol. This protocol is claimed to provide strong security and robust privacy protection, while at the same time the usage of resources on tags is optimized. Nevertheless, in this paper we show how the protocol does not achieve any of its intended security objectives; the main result is that the most valuable information stored on the tag, that is, the static identifier ID, is easily recovered even by a completely passive attacker in a number of ways. More precisely, we start by presenting a traceability attack on the protocol that allows tags to be traced. This essentially exploits the fact that the protocol messages leak out at least one bit of the static identifier. We then present a passive attack (named Norwegian attack) that discloses \(\lfloor \log_2 L \rfloor\) bits of the ID, after observing roughly O(L) authentication sessions. Although this attack may seem less feasible in retrieving the full 96-bits of the ID due to the large number of eavesdropped sessions involved, it is already powerful enough to serve as a basis for a very effective traceability attack. Finally, our last attack represents a step forward in the use of a recent cryptanalysis technique (called Tango attack [2]), which allows for an extremely efficient full disclosure attack, capable of revealing the value of the whole ID after eavesdropping only a very small number of sessions.

Keywords

RFID Cryptanalysis Ultralightweight Authentication 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pedro Peris-Lopez
    • 1
  • Julio Cesar Hernandez-Castro
    • 2
  • Raphael C. -W. Phan
    • 3
  • Juan M. E. Tapiador
    • 4
  • Tieyan Li
    • 5
  1. 1.Security & Privacy Lab, Faculty of EEMCSDelft University of TechnologyThe Netherlands
  2. 2.School of ComputingUniversity of PortsmouthUK
  3. 3.Department of Electronic and Electrical EngineeringLoughborough UniversityUK
  4. 4.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of YorkUK
  5. 5.Institute for Infocomm ResearchA*STAR SingaporeSingapore

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