Towards a Game Theoretic View of Secure Computation

  • Gilad Asharov
  • Ran Canetti
  • Carmit Hazay
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6632)

Abstract

We demonstrate how Game Theoretic concepts and formalism can be used to capture cryptographic notions of security. In the restricted but indicative case of two-party protocols in the face of malicious fail-stop faults, we first show how the traditional notions of secrecy and correctness of protocols can be captured as properties of Nash equilibria in games for rational players. Next, we concentrate on fairness. Here we demonstrate a Game Theoretic notion and two different cryptographic notions that turn out to all be equivalent. In addition, we provide a simulation based notion that implies the previous three. All four notions are weaker than existing cryptographic notions of fairness. In particular, we show that they can be met in some natural setting where existing notions of fairness are provably impossible to achieve.

Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gilad Asharov
    • 1
  • Ran Canetti
    • 2
  • Carmit Hazay
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceBar-Ilan UniversityIsrael
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceTel-Aviv UniversityIsrael
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceAarhus UniversityDenmark

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