Coordination by Contracts in Decentralized Product Design Processes – Towards Efficient Compliance with Recycling Rates in the Automotive Industry
Design processes in the automotive industry are distributed over various companies. If fixed-price contracts are used to coordinate such collaborations, inefficiencies in the design process occur due to existing uncertainties and differing objectives of the partners. To make decentralized design processes more flexible and to reduce inefficiencies, we introduce the conceptual design of incentive contracts and apply it to the case of the compliance with recycling rates in the automotive industry.
KeywordsDesign Process Automotive Industry Supply Chain Management Transfer Payment Development Cost
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