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Efficient Decision Procedures for Message Deducibility and Static Equivalence

  • Bruno Conchinha
  • David Basin
  • Carlos Caleiro
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6561)

Abstract

We consider two standard notions in formal security protocol analysis: message deducibility and static equivalence under equational theories. We present new polynomial-time algorithms for deciding both notions under subterm convergent equational theories and under a theory representing symmetric encryption with the prefix property. For these equational theories, polynomial-time algorithms for the decision problems associated to both notions are well-known (although this has not been proven for static equivalence under the prefix theory). However, our algorithms have a significantly better asymptotic complexity than existing approaches.

As an application, we use our algorithm for static equivalence to discover off-line guessing attacks on the Kerberos protocol when implemented using a symmetric encryption scheme for which the prefix property holds.

Keywords

security protocols equational theories deducibility static equivalence 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruno Conchinha
    • 1
  • David Basin
    • 1
  • Carlos Caleiro
    • 2
  1. 1.Information Security GroupETH ZürichZürichSwitzerland
  2. 2.SQIG - Instituto de Telecomunicações, Department of MathematicsIST, TU LisbonPortugal

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