Unconditional and Composable Security Using a Single Stateful Tamper-Proof Hardware Token

  • Nico Döttling
  • Daniel Kraschewski
  • Jörn Müller-Quade
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6597)


Cryptographic assumptions regarding tamper proof hardware tokens have gained increasing attention. Even if the tamper-proof hardware is issued by one of the parties, and hence not necessarily trusted by the other, many tasks become possible: Tamper proof hardware is sufficient for universally composable protocols, for information-theoretically secure protocols, and even allow to create software which can only be used once (One-Time-Programs). However, all known protocols employing tamper-proof hardware are either indirect, i.e., additional computational assumptions must be used to obtain general two party computations or a large number of devices must be used. In this work we present the first protocol realizing universally composable two-party computations (and even trusted One-Time-Programs) with information-theoretic security using only one single tamper-proof device issued by one of the mutually distrusting parties.


Secure Two-Party Computation Universal Composability Tamper-Proof Hardware Information-Theoretical Security 


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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nico Döttling
    • 1
  • Daniel Kraschewski
    • 1
  • Jörn Müller-Quade
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Cryptography and Security, Faculty of InformaticsKarlsruhe Institute of TechnologyGermany

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