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Institutional Foundations, Committee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Institutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain)

  • Gonzalo CaballeroEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

Legislative organization matters for policy-making, and institutional rules determine the role of property rights, hierarchies, individual deputies, parliamentary groups, transactions and committees in the industrial organization of Congress. The New Institutional Economics and Transaction Cost Politics have given rise to a relevant research program on legislative organization. This paper analyses the institutional foundations of legislative organization of the Spanish Congress from an institutional and transactional comparative perspective. Electoral rules and Committee systems are institutional determinants of the political property rights of congressmen and the structure of governance of legislative organization. This paper studies the industrial organization of the Spanish Congress, and we compare this case with those of the traditional model of the US Congress and the Argentine Congress. In this respect, new light on the young Spanish Congress is shed.

Keywords

Political Party Electoral System Plenary Session Veto Player Electoral Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsUniversity of VigoVigoSpain

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