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Elections in Israel and Turkey

  • Norman SchofieldEmail author
  • Maria Gallego
Chapter

Abstract

To model coalition behavior after an election, we assume that each party chooses a preferred position (or ideal point) in a policy spaceX. As before, the parties are P = { 1, , j, , p}, and the vector of party ideal points is z = (z 1, , z p ). After the election we denote the number of seats controlled by party, j, by s j and let s = (s 1, , s p ) be the of the vector of parliamentary seats.

Keywords

Joint Model Vote Share Winning Coalition Plurality Rule Minimal Winning Coalition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center in Political EconomyWashington University in St. LouisSt. LouisUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsWilfried Laurier UniversityWaterlooCanada

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