Interaction and Resistance: The Recognition of Intentions in New Human-Computer Interaction

  • Vincent C. Müller
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6456)

Abstract

Just as AI has moved away from classical AI, human-computer interaction (HCI) must move away from what I call ‘good old fashioned HCI’ to ‘new HCI’ – it must become a part of cognitive systems research where HCI is one case of the interaction of intelligent agents (we now know that interaction is essential for intelligent agents anyway). For such interaction, we cannot just ‘analyze the data’, but we must assume intentions in the other, and I suggest these are largely recognized through resistance to carrying out one’s own intentions. This does not require fully cognitive agents but can start at a very basic level. New HCI integrates into cognitive systems research and designs intentional systems that provide resistance to the human agent.

Keywords

Human-computer interaction AI cognitive systems interaction intelligence resistance systems design 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vincent C. Müller
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Humanities and Social SciencesAnatolia College/ACTPylaiaGreece

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