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Privilege Escalation Attacks on Android

  • Lucas Davi
  • Alexandra Dmitrienko
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
  • Marcel Winandy
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6531)

Abstract

Android is a modern and popular software platform for smartphones. Among its predominant features is an advanced security model which is based on application-oriented mandatory access control and sandboxing. This allows developers and users to restrict the execution of an application to the privileges it has (mandatorily) assigned at installation time. The exploitation of vulnerabilities in program code is hence believed to be confined within the privilege boundaries of an application’s sandbox. However, in this paper we show that a privilege escalation attack is possible. We show that a genuine application exploited at runtime or a malicious application can escalate granted permissions. Our results immediately imply that Android’s security model cannot deal with a transitive permission usage attack and Android’s sandbox model fails as a last resort against malware and sophisticated runtime attacks.

Keywords

Instruction Sequence Attack Scenario Android Application Android Platform Installation Time 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lucas Davi
    • 1
  • Alexandra Dmitrienko
    • 1
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
    • 2
  • Marcel Winandy
    • 1
  1. 1.System Security LabRuhr-University BochumGermany
  2. 2.Fraunhofer-Institut SIT DarmstadtTechnische Universität DarmstadtGermany

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