Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability

  • Lucie Langer
  • Hugo Jonker
  • Wolter Pieters
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6476)

Abstract

Anonymity and verifiability are crucial security requirements for voting. Still, they seem to be contradictory, and confusion exists about their precise meanings and compatibility. In this paper, we resolve the confusion by showing that both can be expressed in terms of (un)linkability: while anonymity requires unlinkability of voter and vote, verifiability requires linkability of voters and election result. We first provide a conceptual model which captures anonymity as well as verifiability. Second, we express the semantics of (un)linkability in terms of (in)distinguishability. Third, we provide an adversary model that describes which capabilities the attacker has for establishing links. These components form a comprehensive model for describing and analyzing voting system security. In a case study we use our model to analyze the security of the voting scheme Prêt à Voter. Our work contributes to a deeper understanding of anonymity and verifiability and their correlation in voting.

Keywords

anonymity verifiability unlinkability e-voting adversary model 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lucie Langer
    • 1
  • Hugo Jonker
    • 2
  • Wolter Pieters
    • 3
  1. 1.Cryptography and Computer Algebra GroupTechnische Universität DarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.Faculty of Science, Technology and CommunicationUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourg
  3. 3.Centre for Telematics and Information TechnologyUniversity of TwenteNetherlands

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