False-Name-Proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line

  • Taiki Todo
  • Atsushi Iwasaki
  • Makoto Yokoo
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)

Abstract

Recently, mechanism design without monetary transfers is attracting much attention, since in many application domains on Internet, introducing monetary transfers is impossible or undesirable. Mechanism design studies how to design mechanisms that result in good outcomes even when agents strategically report their preferences. However, in highly anonymous settings such as the Internet, declaring preferences dishonestly is not the only way to manipulate the mechanism. Often, it is possible for an agent to pretend to be multiple agents, and submit multiple reports using different identifiers, e.g., different e-mail addresses. Such false-name manipulations are more likely to occur in a mechanism without monetary transfers, since submitting multiple reports would be less risky in such a mechanism. In this paper, we formalize false-name manipulations in facility location problems on the real line and discuss the effect of such manipulations.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Bachrach, Y., Elkind, E.: Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games. In: Proceedings of the Seventh International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pp. 975–982 (2008)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Ching, S., Thomson, W.: Population-monotonic solutions in public good economies with single-peaked preferences. RCER Working Papers 362, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research, RCER (1993)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Conitzer, V.: Anonymity-proof voting rules. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds.) WINE 2008. LNCS, vol. 5385, pp. 295–306. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Lu, P., Wang, Y., Zhou, Y.: Tighter bounds for facility games. In: Leonardi, S. (ed.) WINE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5929, pp. 137–148. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Moulin, H.: On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice 35(4), 437–455 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Penna, P., Schoppmann, F., Silvestri, R., Widmayer, P.: Pseudonyms in cost-sharing games. In: Leonardi, S. (ed.) WINE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5929, pp. 256–267. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Procaccia, A.D., Tennenholtz, M.: Approximate mechanism design without money. In: Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pp. 177–186 (2009)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Schummer, J., Vohra, R.V.: Strategy-proof location on a network. Journal of Economic Theory 104(2), 405–428 (2004)MathSciNetCrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids. Artificial Intelligence 130(2), 167–181 (2001)MathSciNetCrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Taiki Todo
    • 1
  • Atsushi Iwasaki
    • 1
  • Makoto Yokoo
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of InformaticsKyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan

Personalised recommendations