Course Allocation by Proxy Auction

  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Mike Ruberry
  • Jonathan Ullman
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)


We propose a new proxy bidding mechanism to allocate courses to students given students’ reported preferences. Our mechanism is motivated by a specific strategic downgrading manipulation observed in the course allocation mechanism currently used at Harvard Business School (HBS). The proxy bidding mechanism simplifes students’ decisions by directly incorporating downgrading into the mechanism.

Our proxy bidding mechanism is Pareto efficient with respect to lexicographic preferences and can be extended to allow for a more expressive preference language which allows complementarity, substitutability, and indifference. Simulations suggest that the proxy bidding mechanism is robust to the manipulations observed in the HBS mechanism and may yield welfare improvements.


School Choice Harvard Business School Extended Preference Strategic Play Bidding Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Scott Duke Kominers
    • 1
    • 2
  • Mike Ruberry
    • 3
  • Jonathan Ullman
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsHarvard UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Harvard Business SchoolUSA
  3. 3.School of Engineering and Applied SciencesHarvard UniversityUSA

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