Approximation Algorithms for Campaign Management

  • Edith Elkind
  • Piotr Faliszewski
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)

Abstract

We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party’s goal is to make its preferred candidate a winner while paying as little as possible. We describe a 2-approximation algorithm for this problem for a large class of electoral systems known as scoring rules. Our result holds even for weighted voters, and has applications for campaign management in commercial settings. We also give approximation algorithms for our problem for two Condorcet-consistent rules, namely, the Copeland rule and maximin.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Edith Elkind
    • 1
  • Piotr Faliszewski
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Physical and Mathematical SciencesNanyang Technological UniversitySingapore
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceAGH Univ. of Sci. and Tech.KrakówPoland

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