Market Communication in Production Economies

  • Christopher A. Wilkens
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)


We study the information content of equilibrium prices using the market communication model of Deng, Papadimitriou, and Safra [4]. We show that, in the worst case, communicating an exact equilibrium in a production economy requires a number of bits that is a quadratic polynomial in the number of goods, the number of agents, the number of firms, and the number of bits used to represent an endowment.


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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christopher A. Wilkens
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science DivisionUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeleyUSA

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