The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces
- Cite this paper as:
- Aumann Y., Dombb Y. (2010) The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces. In: Saberi A. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
We consider the issue of fair division of goods, using the cake cutting abstraction, and aim to bound the possible degradation in social welfare due to the fairness requirements. Previous work has considered this problem for the setting where the division may allocate each player any number of unconnected pieces. Here, we consider the setting where each player must receive a single connected piece. For this setting, we provide tight bounds on the maximum possible degradation to both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare due to three fairness criteria — proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability.
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