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Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions

  • George Christodoulou
  • Khaled Elbassioni
  • Mahmoud Fouz
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6484)

Abstract

We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space Open image in new window , and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in Open image in new window , each bidder j declares her bid Open image in new window . We give a deterministic truthful mechanism, when the valuations are single-minded: when Open image in new window is a collection of fat objects (respectively, axis-aligned rectangles) in the plane, there is a truthful mechanism with a 1 + ε- (respectively, ⌈logn⌉)-approximation of the social welfare (where n is an upper bound on the maximum integral coordinate of each rectangle). We also consider the non-single-minded case, and design a randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism with approximation guarantee O(1) (respectively, O(logm)).

Keywords

Packing Problem Combinatorial Auction Approximation Guarantee True Valuation Social Welfare Maximization 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • George Christodoulou
    • 1
    • 2
  • Khaled Elbassioni
    • 1
  • Mahmoud Fouz
    • 3
  1. 1.Max-Planck-Institut für InformatikSaarbrückenGermany
  2. 2.Cluster of Excellence “Multimodal Computing and Interaction”Universität des SaarlandesGermany
  3. 3.FR InformatikUniversität des SaarlandesSaarbrückenGermany

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