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Building a Side Channel Based Disassembler

  • Thomas Eisenbarth
  • Christof Paar
  • Björn Weghenkel
Chapter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6340)

Abstract

For the last ten years, side channel research has focused on extracting data leakage with the goal of recovering secret keys of embedded cryptographic implementations. For about the same time it has been known that side channel leakage contains information about many other internal processes of a computing device.

In this work we exploit side channel information to recover large parts of the program executed on an embedded processor. We present the first complete methodology to recover the program code of a microcontroller by evaluating its power consumption only. Besides well-studied methods from side channel analysis, we apply Hidden Markov Models to exploit prior knowledge about the program code. In addition to quantifying the potential of the created side channel based disassembler, we highlight its diverse and unique application scenarios.

Keywords

Hide Markov Model Recognition Rate Smart Card Reverse Engineering Side Channel 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Eisenbarth
    • 1
  • Christof Paar
    • 2
  • Björn Weghenkel
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Mathematical SciencesFlorida Atlantic UniversityBoca RatonUSA
  2. 2.Horst Görtz Institute for IT SecurityRuhr University BochumBochumGermany

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