Versatile Prêt à Voter: Handling Multiple Election Methods with a Unified Interface

  • Zhe Xia
  • Chris Culnane
  • James Heather
  • Hugo Jonker
  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
  • Steve Schneider
  • Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6498)

Abstract

A number of end-to-end verifiable voting schemes have been introduced recently. These schemes aim to allow voters to verify that their votes have contributed in the way they intended to the tally and in addition allow anyone to verify that the tally has been generated correctly. These goals must be achieved while maintaining voter privacy and providing receipt-freeness. However, most of these end-to-end voting schemes are only designed to handle a single election method and the voter interface varies greatly between different schemes. In this paper, we introduce a scheme which handles many of the popular election methods that are currently used around the world. Our scheme not only ensures privacy, receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability, but also keeps the voter interface simple and consistent between various election methods.

Keywords

Prêt à Voter voting scheme end-to-end verifiability receipt-freeness simple and consistent voter interface 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zhe Xia
    • 1
  • Chris Culnane
    • 1
  • James Heather
    • 1
  • Hugo Jonker
    • 2
  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
    • 2
  • Steve Schneider
    • 1
  • Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of ComputingUniversity of SurreyGuildfordU.K.
  2. 2.Faculté des Sciences, de la Technologie et de la CommunicationUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourg

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