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Automatic Generation of Sigma-Protocols

  • Endre Bangerter
  • Thomas Briner
  • Wilko Henecka
  • Stephan Krenn
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
  • Thomas Schneider
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6391)

Abstract

Efficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZK-PoK) are basic building blocks of many cryptographic applications such as identification schemes, group signatures, and secure multi-party computation. Currently, first applications that essentially rely on ZK-PoKs are being deployed in the real world. The most prominent example is the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol, which was adopted by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and implemented as one of the functionalities of the cryptographic chip Trusted Platform Module (TPM).

Implementing systems using ZK-PoK turns out to be challenging, since ZK-PoK are significantly more complex than standard crypto primitives (e.g., encryption and signature schemes). As a result, the design-implementation cycles of ZK-PoK are time-consuming and error-prone.

To overcome this, we present a compiler with corresponding languages for the automatic generation of sound and efficient ZK-PoK based on Σ-protocols. The protocol designer using our compiler formulates the goal of a ZK-PoK proof in a high-level protocol specification language, which abstracts away unnecessary technicalities from the designer. The compiler then automatically generates the protocol implementation in Java code; alternatively, the compiler can output a description of the protocol in LaTeX which can be used for documentation or verification.

Keywords

Zero-Knowledge Protocol Compiler Language Design 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Endre Bangerter
    • 1
  • Thomas Briner
    • 2
  • Wilko Henecka
    • 3
  • Stephan Krenn
    • 4
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
    • 3
  • Thomas Schneider
    • 3
  1. 1.Bern University of Applied SciencesBiel-BienneSwitzerland
  2. 2.Abraxas Informatik AGZürichSwitzerland
  3. 3.Horst Görtz Institute for IT SecurityRuhr-UniversityBochumGermany
  4. 4.University of FribourgSwitzerland

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