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Interpreting Hash Function Security Proofs

  • Juraj Šarinay
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6402)

Abstract

We provide a concrete security treatment of several “provably secure” hash functions. Interpreting arguments behind MQ-HASH, FSB, SWIFFTX and VSH we identify similar lines of reasoning. We aim to formulate the main security claims in a language closer to that of attacks. We evaluate designers’ claims of provable security and quantify them more precisely, deriving “second order” bounds on bounds. While the authors of FSB, MQ-HASH and SWIFFT(X) prove existence of non-trivial lower bounds on security, we show that the quantification of the bounds limits the practical significance of the proofs.

Keywords

hash functions security bounds provable reducibility 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Juraj Šarinay
    • 1
  1. 1.EPFL IC LACAL, Station 14LausanneSwitzerland

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