Identification Schemes of Proofs of Ability Secure against Concurrent Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
We give a series of three identification schemes. All of them are basically 2-round interactive proofs of ability to complete Diffie-Hellman tuples. Despite their simple protocols, the second and the third schemes are proven secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks based on tight reduction to the Gap Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption without the random oracle. In addition, they are more efficient than challenge-and-response 2-round identification schemes from previously known EUF-CMA signature schemes in the standard model.
Our first scheme is similar to half the operation of Diffie-Hellman Key-Exchange. The first scheme is secure only against two-phase attacks based on strong assumptions. Applying the tag framework, and employing a strong one-time signature for the third scheme, we get the preferable schemes above.
KeywordsIdentification Scheme Concurrent Man-in-the-Middle Attack the Gap Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption Tight Reduction
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 10.Dakdouk, R.R.: Theory and Application of Extractable Functions. Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation, Yale University, USA (2009)Google Scholar
- 11.Damgård, I.: Towards Practical Public Key Systems Secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 445–456. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)Google Scholar
- 15.Katz, J.: Efficient Cryptographic Protocols Preventing “Man-in-the-Middle” Attacks. Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation, Columbia University, USA (2002)Google Scholar
- 23.Wu, J., Stinson, D.R.: An Efficient Identification Protocol and the Knowledge of Exponent Assumption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2007/479, http://eprint.iacr.org/