Towards Automatic Analysis of Election Verifiability Properties

  • Ben Smyth
  • Mark Ryan
  • Steve Kremer
  • Mounira Kourjieh
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6186)

Abstract

We present a symbolic definition that captures some cases of election verifiability for electronic voting protocols. Our definition is given in terms of reachability assertions in the applied pi calculus and is amenable to automated reasoning using the software tool ProVerif. The definition distinguishes three aspects of verifiability, which we call individual, universal, and eligibility verifiability. We demonstrate the applicability of our formalism by analysing the protocols due to Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta and a variant of the one by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson (implemented as Civitas by Clarkson, Chong & Myers).

Keywords

Electronic voting protocols election verifiability applied pi calculus ProVerif automated reasoning 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ben Smyth
    • 1
    • 2
  • Mark Ryan
    • 1
  • Steve Kremer
    • 3
  • Mounira Kourjieh
    • 1
    • 4
  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceUniversity of BirminghamUK
  2. 2.École Normale Supérieure & CNRS & INRIAFrance
  3. 3.LSV, ENS Cachan & CNRS & INRIAFrance
  4. 4.Université de ToulouseFrance

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