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Preference Change Triggered by Belief Change: A Principled Approach

  • Jérôme Lang
  • Leendert van der Torre
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6006)

Abstract

Various tasks need to consider preferences in a dynamic way. To evaluate and classify methods for preference change, we introduce eight properties for preferences evolving after some new fact has been learned. Four properties are concerned with persistence of preferences when something being preferred is (partly) satisfied or dissatisfied, and formalize that preference change indicates that the ideal state has not been reached or has become unreachable. Four other properties are concerned with persistence of preferences when, roughly, the agent learns something she already expected to hold, and formalizes that preference change is due to surprise. We define a family of preference change operators, parameterized by a revision function on epistemic states and a semantics for interpreting preferences over formulas, and we give conditions on the revision function and the semantics of preference for each of the eight conditions to hold.

Keywords

Decision Theory Belief Revision Normal World Preference Change Theory Change 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jérôme Lang
    • 1
  • Leendert van der Torre
    • 2
  1. 1.Laboratoire d’Analyse et Modélisation des Systèmes pour l’Aide à la Décision (LAMSADE)Université Paris-DauphineParisFrance
  2. 2.Computer Science and CommunicationsUniversité de LuxembourgLuxembourgLuxembourg

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