Untraceability and Profiling Are Not Mutually Exclusive

  • Sébastien Canard
  • Amandine Jambert
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6264)


In this paper, we study the concept of privacy-preserving multi-service subscription systems. With such system, service providers can propose to their customers, by the way of a subscription, several distinct services that users can access while being anonymous. We moreover study how users can be untraceable w.r.t. the service provider during the subscription process, in such a way that it is additionally possible to make profiling on the users’ customs. This permits the service provider to propose some advertisements to users while protecting the privacy of the latter, even this may be seen as contradictory. We also propose concrete instantiations, based on signature schemes with extensions from Camenisch and Lysyanskaya.


Service Provider Group Signature Signature Scheme Discrete Logarithm Commitment Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sébastien Canard
    • 1
  • Amandine Jambert
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Orange LabsCaen CedexFrance
  2. 2.IMBUniversité Bordeaux 1TalenceFrance

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