Garbled Circuits for Leakage-Resilience: Hardware Implementation and Evaluation of One-Time Programs

(Full Version)
  • Kimmo Järvinen
  • Vladimir Kolesnikov
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
  • Thomas Schneider
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-15031-9_26

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6225)
Cite this paper as:
Järvinen K., Kolesnikov V., Sadeghi AR., Schneider T. (2010) Garbled Circuits for Leakage-Resilience: Hardware Implementation and Evaluation of One-Time Programs. In: Mangard S., Standaert FX. (eds) Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2010. CHES 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6225. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

The power of side-channel leakage attacks on cryptographic implementations is evident. Today’s practical defenses are typically attack-specific countermeasures against certain classes of side-channel attacks. The demand for a more general solution has given rise to the recent theoretical research that aims to build provably leakage-resilient cryptography. This direction is, however, very new and still largely lacks practitioners’ evaluation with regard to both efficiency and practical security. A recent approach, One-Time Programs (OTPs), proposes using Yao’s Garbled Circuit (GC) and very simple tamper-proof hardware to securely implement oblivious transfer, to guarantee leakage resilience.

Our main contributions are (i) a generic architecture for using GC/ OTP modularly, and (ii) hardware implementation and efficiency analysis of GC/OTP evaluation. We implemented two FPGA-based prototypes: a system-on-a-programmable-chip with access to hardware crypto accelerator (suitable for smartcards and future smartphones), and a stand-alone hardware implementation (suitable for ASIC design). We chose AES as a representative complex function for implementation and measurements. As a result of this work, we are able to understand, evaluate and improve the practicality of employing GC/OTP as a leakage-resistance approach.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kimmo Järvinen
    • 1
  • Vladimir Kolesnikov
    • 2
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
    • 3
  • Thomas Schneider
    • 3
  1. 1.Dep. of Information and Comp. ScienceAalto UniversityFinland
  2. 2.Alcatel-Lucent Bell LaboratoriesMurray HillUSA
  3. 3.Horst Görtz Institute for IT-SecurityRuhr-University BochumGermany

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