An Economical Model For Dumping by Dumping in a Cournot Model

  • Nilanjan Banik
  • Fernanda A. Ferreira
  • J. Martins
  • Alberto A. Pinto
Conference paper
Part of the Springer Proceedings in Mathematics book series (PROM, volume 2)

Abstract

We consider an international trade economical model where two firms of different countries compete in quantities and can use three different strategies: (i) repeated collusion, (ii) deviation from the foreigner firm followed by punishment by the home country and then followed by repeated Cournot, or (iii) repeated deviation followed by punishment. In some cases (ii) and (iii) can be interpreted as dumping.We compute the profits of both firms for each strategy and we characterize the economical parameters where each strategy is adopted by the firms.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nilanjan Banik
    • 1
  • Fernanda A. Ferreira
    • 2
  • J. Martins
    • 3
  • Alberto A. Pinto
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.Center for Advanced Financial StudiesInstitute for Financial Management and ResearchChennaiIndia
  2. 2.ESEIGPolytechnic Institute of PortoVila do CondePortugal
  3. 3.LIAAD-INESC Porto LA, Department of Mathematics, School of Technology and ManagementPolytechnic Institute of LeiriaLeiriaPortugal
  4. 4.LIAAD-INESC Porto LA e Departamento de Matemática, Faculdade de CiênciasUniversidade do PortoPortoPortugal
  5. 5.Centro de Matemática e Departamento de Matemática e Aplicações, Escola de CiênciasUniversidade do MinhoBragaPortugal

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