On Generalized Feistel Networks

  • Viet Tung Hoang
  • Phillip Rogaway
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6223)

Abstract

We prove beyond-birthday-bound security for most of the well-known types of generalized Feistel networks: (1) unbalanced Feistel networks, where the n-bit to m-bit round functions may have \(n\ne m\); (2) alternating Feistel networks, where the round functions alternate between contracting and expanding; (3) type-1, type-2, and type-3 Feistel networks, where n-bit to n-bit round functions are used to encipher kn-bit strings for some k ≥ 2; and (4) numeric variants of any of the above, where one enciphers numbers in some given range rather than strings of some given size. Using a unified analytic framework, we show that, in any of these settings, for any ε> 0, with enough rounds, the subject scheme can tolerate CCA attacks of up to q~N1 − ε adversarial queries, where N is the size of the round functions’ domain (the larger domain for alternating Feistel). Prior analyses for most generalized Feistel networks established security to only q~N0.5 queries.

Keywords

Block ciphers coupling Feistel networks generalized Feistel networks modes of operation provable security symmetric techniques 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Viet Tung Hoang
    • 1
  • Phillip Rogaway
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceUniversity of CaliforniaDavisUSA

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