Credential Authenticated Identification and Key Exchange

  • Jan Camenisch
  • Nathalie Casati
  • Thomas Gross
  • Victor Shoup
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_14

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6223)
Cite this paper as:
Camenisch J., Casati N., Gross T., Shoup V. (2010) Credential Authenticated Identification and Key Exchange. In: Rabin T. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010. CRYPTO 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6223. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

This paper initiates a study of two-party identification and key-exchange protocols in which users authenticate themselves by proving possession of credentials satisfying arbitrary policies, instead of using the more traditional mechanism of a public-key infrastructure. Definitions in the universal composability framework are given, and practical protocols satisfying these definitions, for policies of practical interest, are presented. All protocols are analyzed in the common reference string model, assuming adaptive corruptions with erasures, and no random oracles. The new security notion includes password-authenticated key exchange as a special case, and new, practical protocols for this problem are presented as well, including the first such protocol that provides resilience against server compromise (without random oracles).

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan Camenisch
    • 1
  • Nathalie Casati
    • 1
  • Thomas Gross
    • 1
  • Victor Shoup
    • 2
  1. 1.IBM Research, work funded by the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 216483 
  2. 2.NYU, work done while visiting IBM Research, supported by NSF grant CNS-0716690 

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