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All You Can Eat or Breaking a Real-World Contactless Payment System

(Short Paper)
  • Timo Kasper
  • Michael Silbermann
  • Christof Paar
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6052)

Abstract

We investigated a real-world contactless payment application based on mifare Classic cards. In order to analyze the security of the payment system, we combined previous cryptanalytical results and implemented an improved card-only attack with customized low-cost tools, that is to our knowledge the most efficient practical attack to date. We found several flaws implying severe security vulnerabilities on the system level that allow for devastating attacks including identity theft and recharging the amount of money on the cards. We practically verify and demonstrate the attacks on the commercial system.

Keywords

Payment System Authentication Protocol Card Number Linear Feedback Shift Register USENIX Security Symposium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Timo Kasper
    • 1
  • Michael Silbermann
    • 1
  • Christof Paar
    • 1
  1. 1.Horst Görtz Institute for IT SecurityRuhr-University BochumGermany

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