Conqueror: Tamper-Proof Code Execution on Legacy Systems

  • Lorenzo Martignoni
  • Roberto Paleari
  • Danilo Bruschi
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6201)


We present Conqueror, a software-based attestation scheme for tamper-proof code execution on untrusted legacy systems. Beside providing load-time attestation of a piece of code, Conqueror also ensures run-time integrity. Conqueror constitutes a valid alternative to trusted computing platforms, for systems lacking specialized hardware for attestation. We implemented a prototype, specific for the Intel x86 architecture, and evaluated the proposed scheme. Our evaluation showed that, compared to competitors, Conqueror is resistant to static and dynamic attacks and that our scheme represents an important building block for realizing new security systems.


Memory Location Execution Environment Virtual Machine Monitor Memory Page Trust Computing Group 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lorenzo Martignoni
    • 1
  • Roberto Paleari
    • 2
  • Danilo Bruschi
    • 2
  1. 1.Università degli Studi di Udine 
  2. 2.Università degli Studi di Milano 

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