Deviations from Equilibrium in an Experiment on Signaling Games: First Results
In this paper we provide a summary of results concerning two series of experiments we ran based on a modified signalling game, which was presented graphically to subjects on a screen. The game for the initial experiment was selected by Reinhard Selten in coordination with the first named author. It has the interesting property that the strategically stable outcome (Kohlberg and Mertens 1986) does not coincide with the outcome of the Harsanyi-Selten solution (Harsanyi and Selten 1988). However, it is a complex game insofar as standard refinement concepts like the intuitive criterion, or the never-a-weak-best-response criterion, do not help to refine among the equilibria. The second motive for the design was to analyse, how the change in the reward at a particular terminal node would affect behaviour.
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